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CONTRIBUTORY DISPARATE IMPACTS IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
PETER SIEGELMAN*
ABSTRACT

An employer who adopts a facially neutralemployment practice that
disqualifies a largerproportion of protected-class applicants than
others is liable under a disparate impact theory. Defendants can
escape liability if they show that the practice is justified by business
necessity. But demonstrating business necessity requires costly
validation studies that themselves impose a significant burden on
defendants-upwardsof $100,000 accordingto some estimates. This
Article argues that an employer should have a defense against
disparate impact liability if it can show that protected-class
applicantsfailed to make reasonableefforts to train or preparefor a
job related test. That is, Ipropose that when plaintiffs contribute to
a disparity in this way, the employer should not be liable. I
demonstrate that the "lack of effort"defense is consistent with the text
of Title VII and the case law, which has largely ignored this issue.
Finally,I show that my proposal is supported by both the theoretical
rationales underlying disparate impact and a consequentialist
analysis.

* University of Connecticut Law School, peter.siegelman@law.uconn.edu. Thanks to Ian
Ayres, Gene Bardach, Bob Bifulco, Omri Ben-Shahar, Robert Cooter, Dhammika
Dharmapala, John Donohue, Joan Flynn, Linda Krieger, Gideon Parchomovsky, Eric Talley,
Sam Vermont, and seminar participants at University of California, Berkley, University of
Connecticut, and University of Michigan for helpful suggestions. Special thanks to Jon Bauer
for substantive help beyond the call of duty on Section ILA, and to Jeremy Paul for typically
astute expository suggestions. Errors and omissions are entirely my fault, however.
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INTRODUCTION

In the first-and in some sense the paradigmatic---disparate
impact case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' the Supreme Court declared
that Title VII protects workers who are victims of "practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent ...
[that] operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."2 At issue in Griggs was the employer's use of a high school graduation requirement and an
"intelligence" test, both of which disqualified a larger proportion of
black than white applicants.'
Left unexamined by Griggs, and by virtually all subsequent
disparate impact cases, was the question of why the disparity in
pass rates occurred in the first instance.4 The neglect of this
1. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. Id. at 430.
3. Id. at 425-28.
4. The issue of two-party causation in disparate impact law is almost as absent from the
scholarly literature as it is from judicial opinions. For example, Richard Primus's persuasive
recent analysis of the constitutional basis for disparate impact does not consider this issue.
See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and DisparateImpact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 493 (2003). Ramona Paetzold and Steven Willborn focus on cases in which there are no
measured disparities if race and gender are taken into account simultaneously. See Ramona
L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, DeconstructingDisparate Impact: A View of the Model
Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REv. 325, 329-31 (1996). They conclude that:
Ordinary disparate impact cases view causation with blinders, not because the
cases arise in a single-cause context, but because they ignore causes external to
the employer that contribute to the impact. The blinders necessarily mean that
employers may be held legally responsible for impacts that are "caused" in
substantial part by factors external to the employers.
Id. at 354 (second emphasis added). They do not, however, consider cases in which some or
all of the multiple causal factors are internal to the plaintiffs; it is precisely these cases that
are the focus of this Article. In the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Jill
Hasday has argued in favor of imposing a duty on disabled individuals to make reasonable
efforts to mitigate their disabilities as a precondition for maintaining litigation. See Jill Elaine
Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REV. 217, 219
(2004). Under her proposal, employers would not be liable for failing to accommodate a
disabled individual who could have reduced or eliminated his or her own disability at low cost,
but failed to do so. See id. at 226. Her logic is in many ways similar to that developed here,
although the doctrinal contours of disparate impact liability under Title VII are of course
different from disparate treatment under the ADA. Some of the ideas in this Article were
previously explored in a note written under my supervision. See Laya Sleiman, Note, A Duty
To Make ReasonableEfforts and a Defense of the DisparateImpact Doctrine in Employment
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question is understandable in the context of Griggs. The reason
black applicants in 1965 North Carolina had lower high school
graduation rates and scored lower on "intelligence" tests than
whites is obvious: it was the legacy of decades of Jim Crow,
including segregated and inferior education, and hundreds of years
of slavery and discrimination. Much of this legacy remains today
and plays a continuing role in explaining inter-group disparities.
But in the years since Griggs, the problem of disparate impact
liability has come to take on an unappreciated dimension: some
disparities are caused, in part, by applicants' failure to make
reasonable efforts to train for a test or to prepare for some other job
requirement. Thus, imagine a running test that had a higher pass
rate for men than women. Imagine further that most female
applicants did not train for the test, although among those who
made a modest effort to do so, the pass rate was virtually the same
as that for men.5 Or consider a reappointment test for a city auditor
position, for which several of the incumbent Hispanic auditors failed
to study under the unreasonably mistaken belief that they did not
need to take the exam. Although the pass rate for Hispanics who
did study was no lower than for whites, inclusion of the nonstudying Hispanic applicants created at least a prima facie case of
disparate impact.' These examples raise the obvious question of
whether the performance of those who did not train should be
included in the calculation of the tests' disparate impacts. Put
another way, should employers be responsible for the poor performance of non-trainers?
Before addressing this question, an important preliminary issue
must be resolved: Does it constitute "blaming the victim"7 to
attribute some responsibility for disparities in pass rates by race or
gender to the applicants themselves? I believe the answer is "no" for
two reasons. First, I am not suggesting that all, or even most,
Discrimination,72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677 (2004).
5. This is not a hypothetical example. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.
(Lanning1), 181 F.3d 478, 482-83, 495 (3d Cir. 1999), discussed infra at greater length.
6. This example is also taken from an actual case, Contrerasv. City of Los Angeles, 656
F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1981), discussed infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
7. This phrase was coined by the sociologist William Ryan to describe an "ideology ...
[that] attributes defect and inadequacy to the malignant nature of [factors] ... located within
the victim, inside his skin." WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTM 7 (2d ed. 1976).
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disparities are caused even in part by the victims of such disparities. In many instances, there will be little or nothing that plaintiffs
can do to overcome the effects of an employment requirement. My
analysis is limited only to those cases in which there is something
that plaintiffs could have done to improve their chances of passing
a test or meeting some other requirement. Second, I will argue that
applicants should only be required to make such efforts to prepare
or train for a test as are both feasible and reasonable. Those who
fail to meet this standard can be seen, plausibly, as inflicting
injuries on themselves; but for their own actions, which could have
been different, a more successful outcome would have been realized.
When the "victim" and the "injurer" are actually the same person,
one is free to characterize the explanation for the plaintiffs lack of
success as "blaming the injurer," rather than "blaming the victim."
In one sense, the existence of two-party disparate impacts is an
indicator of progress. No longer is it true that the only reason black
or female applicants fare worse than whites or males is the dead
hand of the past. Put another way, to the extent that disparities in
pass rates are caused by applicants' failure to make reasonable
efforts to train, it is tautologically true that the disparities would be
smaller if such efforts had been made, regardless of the applicant's
race or gender. The good news, then, is that there is something else
we can do about disparate impacts besides outlawing them-we can
encourage applicants to eliminate the disparities themselves by
making reasonable efforts.
This Article suggests that the way to accomplish this goal is to
give employers an affirmative defense if they can show that
plaintiffs seeking to establish disparate impact liability failed to
make reasonable efforts to meet the job requirement being challenged. Following a description of the problem in Part I, Part II
discusses the statutory and case law bases for disparate impact
liability when plaintiffs fail to make reasonable efforts to train for
or to pass a test. I show that such liability is consistent with Title
VII and with the meager body of cases that have recognized the
problem. Part III then examines various theoretical justifications
for disparate impact liability. I conclude that these theories support,
or are at least consistent with, a requirement that plaintiffs make
reasonable efforts to prepare for a test. Drawing loosely on the
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economic theory of tort law, Part IV offers a consequentialist
analysis of a reasonable efforts requirement, demonstrating why
such a requirement is likely to be welfare-enhancing. Finally, Part
V shows how a duty to make reasonable efforts could be operationalized, and also considers some implementation issues.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of two-party causality in disparate impact suits has
not been widely recognized or adequately addressed by either courts
or scholars. To fix ideas, I begin with an example, which also
illustrates the basic contours of disparate impact liability.
A. The Lanning Problem
Lanning v. SoutheasternPennsylvania TransportationAuthority
(SEPTA) concerned the use of a timed running test as a criterion
for hiring transit police officers.8 To make out a prima facie case of
disparate impact, the law requires that plaintiffs identify "a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact."9 In
this case, the particularity requirement was easily met by pointing
to the cutoff score on the test, which had been set at 12 minutes for
a 1.5 mile run, in order to screen out those with an aerobic capacity
of less than 42.5 mL/kg/min.10
The standard for what constitutes a cognizable disparate impact
is articulated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
Performance Selection Guidelines, which suggest that an employment practice that generates
[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group
with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal
8. 181 F.3d 478, 484 (3d Cir. 1999).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 105(a), § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 105 Stat.
1071, 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006)).
10. Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 482. The defendant's expert testified that aerobic capacity was
an important attribute of the police officer positions at issue, and that the running test
measured this capacity. See id. It was never established, however, that a capacity of 42.5 mL
was necessary to do the job. See id.
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enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a
greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by
Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact."

Twelve percent of the female applicants completed the run in under
the threshold time, while 60 percent of male applicants did,12 so the
test had a pass rate ratio of 0.2 (.12/.6), far short of the EEOC's
4/5ths threshold.
The Lanning I plaintiffs clearly made out a prima facie case of
disparate impact, but SEPTA had an affirmative defense if it could
show that the contested selection practice was "job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity." 3
Although the definition of what constitutes "job relatedness" and
"business necessity" are among the murkiest areas of employment
discrimination law, the basic idea is that selection procedures must
accurately predict actual performance in an important area of the
job. 14 In Lanning I, a divided panel of the Third Circuit concluded
that the 12.5 minute cutoff score might have been set at a level
11. EEOC Guidelines for Personnel Selection, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2006). Although the
EEOC does not have formal rule-making authority in this area, the guidelines have
nevertheless been accorded "great deference." See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-34 (1971). Courts are split on whether a showing of statistical significance is
required in addition to a ratio of selection rates below 80 percent. Courts also disagree about
whether statistical significance is enough to sustain liability even when the ratio of selection
rates is above 80 percent. See, e.g., Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404, 409, 412-13 (6th
Cir. 2005) (finding defendants liable for a statistically significant disparity in pass rates, even
though the ratio of pass rates was above the EEOC's 80 percent threshold). For a
sophisticated recent analysis of the statistical properties of the 4/5ths rule, see Philip L. Roth,
Philip Bobko, & Fred S. Switzer III, Modeling the Behaviorof the 4/5ths Rule for Determining
Adverse Impact: Reasonsfor Caution,91 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 507 (2006) (criticizing the 4/5ths
rule for leading to high rates of false positives). A qualified defense of the rule is provided by
Paul Meier, Jerome Sacks & Sandy L. Zabell, What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics,
Employment Discrimination,and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 139 (asserting
that the 4/5ths rule remedies some of the defects of a purely statistical approach to liability,
which tends to punish even small relative disparities if sample sizes are large enough).
12. LanningI,181 F.3d at 482-83.
13. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(k)(1)(A)(i). The statute also provides that even when the
defendant can demonstrate the job relatedness and business necessity of its selection
procedure, the plaintiff may nevertheless prevail if she can identify an alternative
employment practice that would suit the employer's legitimate interests with a smaller
disparity in selection rates. Id.
14. See Equal Employment Opportunity Guideline, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (2006)
(explaining that discriminatory tests must be "predictive of ... important elements of work
behavior which comprise ... the job ... for which candidates are being evaluated").
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above "the minimum qualifications necessary for successful
performance of the job in question," which was also what it concluded the business necessity standard required. 5 Ultimately,
SEPTA was able to demonstrate that the cutoff score on the running
test was job related and consistent with business necessity as
required by Title VII and Lanning .6

The problem, however, is that this requirement can be an
extremely onerous burden. Although the cost of conducting a sufficiently rigorous validation study to establish business necessity is
unknown, the anecdotal evidence suggests that it is in the range of
several hundred thousand dollars.' 7 This amounts to a significant
cost even for large employers and is likely to be prohibitive for
smaller ones. Facing this prospect, many employers will find it in
their best interest to lower the passing score, which necessarily
reduces disparate impacts, or simply drop the test altogether. In
either case, employers' ability to match workers to jobs will be
impaired.
If there was a satisfactory alternative to making employers like
SEPTA conduct a costly and time-consuming validation study, and
if, in addition, the alternative was appealing on doctrinal and public
policy grounds, cases like Lanning I could be resolved in a more
satisfying way. I suggest that there is such an alternative, one that
begins with facts about the case that the Lanning I majority
ignored. As the dissent stressed:

15. Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 481. The case was then remanded for further hearing on
whether the cutoff score appropriately measured the minimum qualifications for the job. Id.
at 494. On rehearing after remand, the Third Circuit reversed course and upheld the district
court's decision to permit the use of the challenged test. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth. (Lanning I1), 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding use of cutoff score that
disqualified more women than men as job related and consistent with business necessity).
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 113 n.106 (1983) (noting that the costs of a validation study in 1978
were in the hundreds of thousands of dollars); James Gwartney et al., Statistics,the Law and
Title VII: An Economist's View, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 643 (1979) (estimating that it
cost $20,000 to $100,000 to validate a single test twenty-seven years ago); Mark Kelman,
Concepts of Discriminationin "GeneralAbility" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1169
n.31 (1991) (arguing that "[v]alidating tests locally can certainly be expensive, with cost
running into the many hundreds of thousands of dollars").
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The named plaintiffs and some of the class members who failed
a "cavalier" attitude towards the running test.
demonstrated ...
Videotapes showed some of these applicants walking at the
halfway point, either because they were indifferent or unable to
run for even that short a period of time. Thus, although there
was a significant disparity between the pass-fail rates of male
and female applicants, the extent of the difference appears to
by the approach taken by some of the
have been exaggerated ...
applicants.
A physiologist, Dr. Lynda Ransdell, testified that 40% of all
women starting at an aerobic capacity of 35 to 37 mL can train
to pass the running test in eight weeks, and that 10% of all
women between 20 and 29 years of age can do so without any
training. She concluded that the average sedentary woman can
achieve SEPTA's performance standard with only moderate
training. SEPTA sent applicants a letter outlining recommended
training techniques that Dr. Ransdell testified were adequate."

Assuming the dissent's characterization of the facts is accurate,
Lanning I raises the possibility that an identified disparate impact
can have two causes. On one hand, the female applicants for the
SEPTA jobs were almost certainly slower in the running test
than their male counterparts, on average, before either group had
done any training. 9 But the failure of the female applicants to train
or prepare for the running test-or perhaps to run hard during
the exam itself-also apparently explained at least some of the

gender disparity in test results. 20 As I argue below, when plaintiffs
18. Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 495 (Weiss, J., dissenting). An interesting question not raised
in any of the opinions is whether the disparate impact might have been eliminated if the
employer had required training itself, as well as a passing score on the running test, as a
condition of employment. If training were as effective as Judge Weiss believed, mandatory
training might have eliminated the gender disparity in pass rates, especially since training
would have helped the female applicants more than it did the male applicants.
19. Nothing turns on whether average differences in running speed between men and
women are "innate" or "cultural," as long as the dissent is correct that the differences can be
overcome, or at least diminished, by training.
20. An important question, discussed infra Part V.B, is whether the employer could
defend against a disparate impact claim by arguing that there would be no aggregate
male/female disparity at all if sufficient numbers of women adequately trained for the test,
or whether the defense would be limited to challenging individual plaintiffs who did not exert
sufficient effort to train for or take the test. Given the difference in pass rates by gender, 12
percent compared to 60 percent, it seems unlikely that more training by women would have
completely eliminated the disparity in Lanning.Note, however, that the EEOC's 80 percent
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contribute to the existence of a disparity by their failure to make
reasonable efforts to train for a job related test, employers should
not be held liable for the disparate impact.
B. Generalizing the Example: The Breadth of the Problem
It is worth stressing at this point that not all disparate impact
cases involve contribution by plaintiffs. For example, a minimum
height requirement for prison guards2 is likely to have a disparate
impact by gender that-assuming height is unalterable--cannot be
overcome by any amount of "effort" by female applicants. Tests that
cannot be studied or trained for-personality tests, for instanceare also immune from these problems, precisely because there is
nothing that applicants could do to change either their own results
or the overall disparity. But the prospect that plaintiffs have
contributed to a measured disparity in test outcomes is at least
potentially an issue in many situations.
The magnitude of the problem is ultimately an empirical question, one that cannot be resolved with anecdotes. Unfortunately, the
question has no compelling answer. At a theoretical level, Stephen
Coate and Glenn Loury have developed a model of what is essentially a moral hazard2 2 in antidiscrimination law, which suggests
that there will be some circumstances in which "too much" protection can lead protected-class workers to curtail their own investments in human capital.2" As they put it, "[i]f the policy forces firms
to 'patronize' some workers by setting lower standards for them,
then the workers may be persuaded that they can get desired jobs
without making costly investments in skills."2 4 But they offer no
standard requires only that the female pass rate be at least 80 percent of the male rate-here,
48 percent, or 0.8(0.6)-to avoid a disparate impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2006). Although
training conceivably might have increased the female pass rate four-fold to 48 percent, this
seems unlikely.
21. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (striking down an Alabama
statute that required prison guards to be at least 5 feet 2 inches tall on the basis that it had
a disparate impact on women).
22. Moral hazard may be loosely defined as a change in behavior brought about by the
presence of insurance. See infra text accompanying notes 117-18 for a further discussion of
this term.
23. Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, AntidiscriminationEnforcement and the Problem of
Patronization,83 AM. ECON. REv. 92 (1993).
24. Id. at 92.
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empirical evidence on the importance of this kind of feedback from
civil rights protection to lower skill investment by protected groups,
and there are reasons to doubt that their characterization of the
disincentives is applicable to disparate impact doctrine.2 5
Although my discussion of the case law in the next Part offers
several illustrations of disparate impact plaintiffs who failed to
train for tests,2 6 these anecdotes obviously do not have the value of
empirical evidence. The relative scarcity of such cases may indicate
that the problem is not widespread, but it could just as well suggest
that no one has yet recognized the problem's existence.
Regardless of its empirical importance, however, the two-party
causality problem in disparate impact law still calls for our
attention as a logical and moral matter. Normatively, the law
should treat joint causation in disparate impact cases very differently from the disparate treatment setting. The legal system does,
and should, afford disparate treatment protection to those plaintiffs
whose behavior is imperfect or non-exemplary. 27 But the case for
protecting disparate impact plaintiffs from the consequences of their
own non-exemplary behavior is much weaker. Instead, I argue that
the law should give employers an affirmative defense to a disparate
impact claim if they can show that plaintiffs failed to make reasonable efforts.28

25. See infraPart IV.A. In a recent empirical paper, Pedro Carneiro, James Heckman, and
Dimitriy Masterov demonstrated that inter-race gaps in the acquisition ofpre-market skills
are largely uninfluenced by market outcomes of any kind, including the existence of labor
market discrimination and presumably-although they do not explicitly say so--antidiscrimination laws. Pedro Carneiro et al., Labor Market Discrimination and Racial
Differences in Premarket Factors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2005). Note, however, that both Coate
& Loury and Carneiro et al. are interested in the long-term relationship between labor market
conditions and pre-market investment in skill acquisition, for example, by youth who are still
in school. Thus, both papers are of questionable relevance to the short-term decision by
someone who is already in the labor market to train or study for a particular test.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. The paradigmatic case is a black worker who is fired for stealing or other malfeasance,
but who demonstrates that whites who committed similar bad acts were not fired. Although
stealing is clearly a fireable offense, if it is punished uniformly, racial disparities in the
punishment for stealing do and should give rise to liability for discrimination. I discuss these
issues at length elsewhere. See PETER SIEGELMAN, PROTECTING THE COMPROMISED WORKER

(forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
28. See infra Part V.A (discussing the term "reasonable efforts").
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II. FITTING A DUTY To TRAIN INTO THE LAW OF DISPARATE IMPACT

This Part makes three arguments. First, I show how the mechanics of a duty to train could be integrated into the broad contours of
the existing defense to disparate impact liability. Next, I demonstrate why my proposal is consistent with the text of Title VII's
provisions governing disparate impact. In the final section, I review
the case law that speaks to whether defendants already have a
reasonable efforts defense.
A. The Statutory Bases for a ReasonableEfforts Defense
Whatever the theoretical justifications for a reasonable efforts
defense, the proposal immediately confronts two practical problems.
First, how would the proposal intersect with existing statutory
defenses? And second, is there a sufficient grounding for the
proposal in the text of Title VII? I discuss these issues in turn.
1. Integratinga FailureTo Train Defense with CurrentDefenses
to a PrimaFacie Case of DisparateImpact
Section 703(k) of Title VII was added by the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, and embodies Congressional recognition of both the existence
of disparate impact liability and the defense an employer has to a
plaintiffs prima facie case of disparate impact.2 9 The section makes
clear that once a plaintiff establishes that an employer uses "a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact,""°
the employer can escape liability if she can "demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity."'" This language seems to leave
two equally unsatisfactory possibilities for my suggested failure to
train defense.
First, failure to train might serve as a complete alternative to the
standard business necessity defense. On this account, an employer
29. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 105(a), § 703(c)(1)(A)(i), 105 Stat.
1071, 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(I) (2006)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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could escape liability in either of two ways: (a) by demonstrating a
test's job relatedness and business necessity; or (b) by showing that
plaintiffs failed to make reasonable efforts to train for the test. This
standard obliges plaintiffs to train for any test, even one that is
manifestly not job related or consistent with business necessity,
before they can mount a disparate impact claim. It raises the
specter that an employer might choose a test precisely to discourage
applicants from a group that would have to train harder to pass. For
example, a law school intent on limiting the number of women on its
faculty might adopt a running test, which is clearly not job related,
in order to discourage women from applying. Women who wanted to
challenge the test's disparate impact would nevertheless have to
train for it in order to surmount the employer's reasonable efforts
defense, even though the test itself was illegitimate."
A second possibility is that the reasonable efforts defense would
add nothing to existing law; if defendants always had to prove
business necessity and job relatedness, it would not matter whether
plaintiffs trained for the test because the test would have to be
justified in either case.
Neither prospect is appealing. The first allows employers to
exploit the 'lack of effort" defense by erecting barriers to exclude
protected-class members when the latter have to undertake more
arduous training than others. The second eliminates any requirement that applicants make reasonable efforts, since everything
turns on the nature of the test itself. In essence, this eliminates the
possibility of two-party disparities, precluding any recognition of the
contribution plaintiffs might make to producing an uneven outcome.
As I argue at length below,3 3 this is not a good result on either
equitable or consequentialist grounds.
A better solution is to make lack of effort a substitute only for the
business necessity prong of the employer's defense, while maintaining the requirement that employers demonstrate job relatedness. In
32. Note, however, that any employer who deployed a test with the intent to
disproportionately screen out protected class workers would obviously be liable under a
disparate treatment theory. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (2006) (allowing use of tests only if they are not "designed, intended, or used to
discriminate"). Disparate impact liability would be useful, in this context, only if the plaintiff
lacked sufficient evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent.
33. See infra Part IV.
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other words, once a plaintiff made a prima facie case of disparate
impact, the employer would always have to establish that the test
was job related. Having done so, an employer would then face two
alternatives. First, she could show that the test was justified by
business necessity.3 4 Alternatively, after proving job relatedness, the
employer might show that the plaintiffs failed to make reasonable
efforts to train for the test. This would obviate the need for demonstrating business necessity. For example, in Lanning I, SEPTA
could have prevailed under this standard without having to show
that the cutoff score actually measured the minimum acceptable
level of aerobic performance if it could demonstrate that many
women in fact failed to make reasonable efforts to prepare for the
test.
My proposal maintains the requirement that tests with disparate
impact be job related. Loosely speaking, this means that a test must
be a reasonably accurate predictor of performance on an important
aspect of the job.35 Preserving this requirement prevents employers
from choosing a test merely to screen out workers with high training
costs. On the other hand, the proposal serves the interests of
employers-and, as I argue in Parts III and IV, of society as a
whole-by recognizing that some disparate results are due, in part,
to the behavior of plaintiffs. For reasons I detail below, when
employers can establish that plaintiffs failed to undertake reasonable training efforts, they should be excused from having to argue
for the "necessity" of the selection mechanism.3"
2. Statutory Bases for a Failure To Train Defense
Title VII contains three sections-§ 703(k)(1)(A)(i), § 703(k)(1)
(B)(ii), and § 706(g)-that can serve to ground a failure to train
defense. Although none of these sections compels the recognition of
the proposed failure to train defense, it is entirely compatible with
34. In Lanning II, for example, SEPTA was ultimately able to convince both the trial court
and the Third Circuit that the twelve minute cutoff time for the running test was "necessary"
because it measured the minimum aerobic capacity necessary to be an acceptable police
officer. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanningfl), 308 F.3d 286, 288 (3d
Cir. 2002).
35. For a summary of the law regarding the job relatedness requirement, see BARBARA
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 106-10 (3d ed. 1996).
36. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
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the statute and may actually help to explain a perplexing redundancy in the text.
a. § 703(k)(1)(A)(i) and Causation
37
As noted above, § 703(k) was added by the 1991 Civil Rights Act
to codify Congress's understanding of disparate impact liability. The
text states that an "unlawful employment practice based on
disparate impact"38 occurs when "a complaining party demonstrates
that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes

a disparate impact

....

,,3'

The use of the word "causes," instead of

more neutral language such as "has," "gives rise to," or "generates,"
offers some support for a failure to train defense. The argument is
straightforward: the use of "causes" opens up the possibility that
jointly caused events may not result in liability for the employer. In
particular, when plaintiffs fail to train, the selection device chosen
by the employer is not the sole cause of the disparate impact. The
disparity is as much the result of plaintiffs' lack of effort as it is of
the test itself.
The obvious-and correct-response to this argument is that
Congress did not understand "causes a disparate impact" to mean
"causes a disparate impact all by itself." In fact, it is unlikely that
any selection procedure could cause a disparate impact "all by
itself'; taken literally, this reading would eliminate disparate
impact liability altogether.4" Cases involving causation by both
plaintiff and defendant might be distinguished from those in which
causation is divided between employers and "broader social factors,"
as in Griggs. However, the fact remains that Congress's use of
"causes," rather than an alternative verb, offers some support for
limiting liability when the causation is clearly divided between
defendants and plaintiffs.
37. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 105(a), § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 105 Stat.
1071, 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k) (2006)).
38. Id.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. In Griggs, for example, the employer's use of a high school graduation requirement
would not have caused a disparate impact by race were it not for background social conditions
that restricted the availability of secondary education to African American applicants.
Paetzold & Willborn describe this as a case of "concurrence," meaning that two factors
combine to create the disparity in results. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 4, at 329-30.
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b. § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii) and Job Relatedness
Section 703(k)(1)(B)(ii) is somewhat puzzling; it reads: "If the
respondent demonstrates that the specific employment practice does
not cause a disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required
to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity."'" Presumably, this section was meant to cover situations in
which there is a dispute about what constitutes the relevant
baseline for measuring disparities. For example, suppose a restaurant's use of word-of-mouth to hire its waitstaff results in a labor
force that is 35 percent female. Suppose further that the plaintiffs
claim that this practice has a disparate impact because the relevant
labor market from which the waitstaff was drawn is 50 percent
female. The defendant, however, is able to convince the court that
the relevant labor market-say, persons with more than five years
experience waiting tables-is actually only 30 percent female, so
there is no disparate impact against women.4 2 In this instance,
Section 703(k)(1)(B)(ii) would forestall the employer's need to justify
the word-of-mouth hiring practice by demonstrating its consistency
with business necessity.4 3
This situation poses a puzzle: if there is no disparate impact in
the first place, why should an employer ever have to justify a
practice's consistency with business necessity? If no disparate
impact exists, then there is nothing to justify on the basis that it is
required by business necessity. Moreover, § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii) is as
interesting for what it omits as for what it redundantly seems to
include. Missing entirely is any language about the job relatedness
requirement, which seems to suggest that employers have to show
job relatedness even when there is not any cognizable disparate
impact at all.
The proposed failure to train defense not only comports with the
language of § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii), but also offers a partial resolution of
the over and underinclusiveness problems just described. Suppose
41. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii). Note again the reference to a "specific
employment practice [that] does not cause the disparate impact." Id.
42. This hypothetical is drawn from the facts of EEOC v.Joe's Stone Crab,Inc., 220 F.3d
1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
43. See id.
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a plaintiff asserts that there is a cognizable disparate impact, and,
instead of refuting the existence of a disparity, the employer argues
that the reason for the disparity was that the plaintiff failed to train
for the test. If such a defense were recognized, the employer would
not need to show the business necessity of the proposed test. But the
omission of any job relatedness language from § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii)
means that the employer would still have to demonstrate the test's
job relatedness. 4 The possibility that a test could have a disparate
impact that is excused by the applicant's failure to train makes
sense of what would otherwise be a puzzling requirement-that an
employer demonstrate job relatedness even when there was no
disparate impact in the first instance. The statute might be
referring to the case in which there is a disparity, but the disparity
is justified by something other than the business necessity of the
practice at issue.4"
c. § 706(g) and the Duty To Mitigate
Section 706(g)(1) describes the basic remedies available under
Title VII. 46 Embodying a principle widely recognized in other
remedial settings, the section imposes an avoidability, or duty to
mitigate, requirement on prevailing plaintiffs, reducing back pay
damages by "amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against. 4 7 Courts have interpreted
this straightforward language to mean that a victim's actual or
potential earnings-if the latter is greater-are to be deducted from
the amount the defendant owes, on the principle that the plaintiff

44. As explained earlier, this has the effect of preventing an employer from using a bogus
test to disqualify protected-class applicants. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
45. Of course, it might just have been bad drafting.
46. The language of § 706(g) refers explicitly to respondents who have "intentionally
engaged in ...
an unlawful employment practice." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 706(g), 78 Stat. 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006)). At first blush, this
language might seem to exclude all of the disparate impact claims that are our concern. This
section, however, has been read to authorize damages in cases of disparate impact liability,
despite the language referring to "intent." See, e.g., Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc.,
462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that in the context of§ 706(g), "intentional" refers
not to the discrimination itself, but to the act of choosing a particular employment practice
that has a disparate impact).
47. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g).
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should offset the harm caused by the defendant by finding other
work, to the extent feasible.4"
The duty to mitigate is usually applied after the defendant's
wrongful actions have harmed the plaintiff. But it is not implausible
or unreasonable to view the plaintiff's failure to train for a test as
a kind of ex ante failure to mitigate the harm that results from the
test itself. So understood, § 706(g) might be read to eliminate damages for a plaintiff who could have had the job if she had trained for
the test, but failed to do so." Title VII's codification of a duty to
mitigate thus implicitly recognizes that plaintiffs may play a role in
creating-or reducing-a defendant's backpay liability, and it is
precisely this two-party or interactional harm that is at the center
of my argument.
B. The Case Law
An extensive body of case law defines what constitutes a legally
cognizable disparity." Largely missing from the cases, however, is
any discussion of whether a disparity in pass rates by race or sex
is excused when plaintiffs' behavior is partially or even wholly
responsible for the observed disparity. A careful search of the
disparate impact decisions reveals only a very few examples in
which courts have taken any notice at all of plaintiffs' behavior, let
alone suggested whether such behavior could serve as a defense for
an employer. Even in Lanning I, the majority never acknowledged
the dissent's observations about the lack of training or effort by
some of the plaintiffs."' Hence, it is unclear whether that case
48. The duty to mitigate, "rooted in an ancient principle of law, requires the claimant to
use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment. Although the unemployed or
underemployed plaintiff need not go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a
demeaning position, he forfeits his right to backpay if he refuses a job substantially equivalent
to the one he was denied." Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) (citations
omitted).
49. More generally, failure to train would not reduce a plaintiffs damages to zero unless
the employer could show that training would have guaranteed that the plaintiff would have
gotten the job for which she applied. But if training would have raised the plaintiffs
probability of getting the job from 20 percent to 45 percent, then back pay might be reduced
by 25 percent (45-20) of foregone earnings to reflect the probabilistic opportunity to mitigate
that the plaintiff failed to take.
50. For an analytic survey, see LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 135-62.
51. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning 1), 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir.
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affirmatively held that lack of training or effort by plaintiffs was not
a defense in a disparate impact claim, or merely suggested this
conclusion by negative implication."
In this Part, I describe and analyze what seem to be the relevant
precedents on this issue. The cases can be grouped into three categories. Courts in the first group implicitly recognize that plaintiffs'
failure to train may serve as a defense to a disparate impact claim,
although no court does so explicitly. In a second group of cases,
courts have opined on whether disparate impact liability reaches
selection criteria based on a plaintiffs easily mutable characteristics, such as hairstyle or dress. Although not directly on point, the
general conclusion in these cases is that when plaintiffs can easily
alter their behavior to eliminate the disparity, they have no
cognizable disparate impact claim. Finally, a few cases take what
seems to be a pure "effects" perspective and suggest that disparate
impact liability does not permit any investigation whatsoever into
the reasons for the disparity-including, presumably, plaintiffs'
failure to train or prepare. I explain why the latter cases are not
relevant to my argument in Section 3.
1. FailureTo Train as a Defense to Liability
Although no court has ever based its decision on the "failure to
train" rationale, some courts do seem to suggest, albeit obliquely,
that plaintiffs who do not try hard enough to pass a test cannot then
pursue a disparate impact claim. For example, In re Scott involved
a 34-year-old male state trooper who, like the Lanning plaintiffs,
complained about a timed running test.53 The Vermont State Police
required males between 30 and 39 years of age to run 1.5 miles in
less than 12 minutes and 51 seconds in order to be retained on the
force.5 4 Scott failed this test on four separate occasions, never
running faster than 14 minutes and 29 seconds.5 5 Moreover, he
1999).
52. The cutoff score was ultimately upheld on rehearing. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth. (LanningI1), 308 F.3d 286, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2002). The final opinion does seem
to give some weight to the fact that some of the plaintiffs failed to train. See id.
53. 779 A.2d 655 (Vt. 2001).
54. Id. at 657.
55. Id. at 657-58.
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failed to "take advantage of his employer's offers to train on work
time, ... [refused] assistance in formulating an individual exercise
program," and apparently did not train for the test at all.56 Although
he was chided by the court for these failures, Scott's lack of training
was, in the end, irrelevant to the Vermont Supreme Court's holding
57
that he had not made out a prima facie case of disparate impact.
Berkman v. New York involved a series of physical exams for
firefighters.5 8 The defendant "obtained foundation funding for a
special training program for women to prepare them for the test.
Most of the women who participated actively in the training
program passed the physical test.... The passing rates on the
physical test were: men, 95.42 percent; women, 46.67 percent."59 The
court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs claim that the test had a
disparate impact. 60 Although the court noted that the defendant
offered training for the test, that the plaintiff apparently refused
this training, and that the training was effective, its reasoning did
not explicitly turn on any of these factors.6 '
In Gilbert v. Little Rock, Grady Anthony alleged that the Little
Rock Police Department's test for promotion to lieutenant had a
disparate impact based on race. 62 The court found that:
Eighty items from the 1980 examination (on which Anthony
scored 100) for which he had studied were used in the 1982 test,
word for word. Scores for these items totaled 80 out of the
56. Id. at 658.
57. Id. at 662. The court concluded that:
[Miale troopers did not have a higher percentage of test failures than women
troopers [so there was no disparate impact]. Moreover, [Scott's] claim that he
was discriminated against because female troopers and older troopers were held
to a "lesser standard" suffers from a fatal factual flaw: [his] times for the 1.5
mile test were insufficient even if he had received the "benefit" of being assessed
either by the standard required of women in his age group or for older troopers.
Id. at 661.

58. 812 F.2d 52, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1987).
59. Id. at 55.
60. Id. at 59.
61. Id. Instead, Judge Newman's rationale for upholding the test was that it measured
strength, which was an important and legitimate requirement for firefighting, even if other
attributes such as stamina might also be important and were not well measured. Id. at 59-60.
Judge Newman also pointed out that a greater emphasis on stamina would not have made
much, if any, difference to the gender disparity. Id. at 60.
62. 544 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Ark. 1982).

536

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:515

possible 100 points. Grady Anthony missed 24 of these identical
items in 1982 that he had gotten right in 1980. In spite of his
contentions, the test does not improperly impact upon blacks,
but instead the low test score resulted from lack of study [sic] .63

Although the court in Gilbert opined that the plaintiffs low test
score was the result of his own failings,64 the disparate impact issue
was never squarely addressed. Consequently, this case does not
speak to the question of whether a failure to study limits a plaintiffs disparate impact claim.65
Somewhat more on point is Perry v. Orange County, in which
the plaintiffs originally alleged that a test for promotion to lieutenant in the fire department had a disparate impact by race. 6
Commenting on one of the plaintiffs, the magistrate judge pointed
out that:
[The trial court] also noted that [plaintiffs expert] Dr. Hoffman
did not "take into account the potential impact of failure to
study." Dr. Hoffman should have investigated plaintiffs' test
preparation and other non-discriminatory factors that affected
test scores. [Plaintiff] McLean underscores these failings and
plaintiffs' unreasonable pursuit of the disparate impact claim.
McLean should have been excluded from the disparate impact
analysis because he did not attend an Orientation Workshop, did
not request the materials from the Orientation Workshop, and
63. Id. at 1253. Anthony claimed that his lack of studying was attributable to the
Department, which subjected him to stress, failed to give him sufficient notice of the test date
and contents, and allowed him insufficient study time. Id. at 1252. The court rejected these
claims out of hand. See id.
64. Id. at 1253.
65. The opinion does not make it clear whether Anthony was even raising a disparate
impact claim in the first instance, although the court's description makes it seem as if that
was at least part of the plaintiff's theory. See id. at 1233 (noting that part of the plaintiffs
claim was "that the promotion system ... impacts ... black employees in a disproportionate
fashion").
66. 341 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202 (M.D. Fla. 2004). Given the unusual procedural posture
of the litigation, however, the opinion does not do much to clarify whether the court thought
plaintiffs had any duty to prepare or train for the exam. The case was actually before the
court on the defendant's motion to recover its fees after the plaintiffs lost on summary
judgment and their appeal was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 1202. Given that the
court required plaintiffs to pay some of the defendant's fees, id. at 1218, this was presumably
an unusually weak case, signaling frivolousness or bad faith by the plaintiffs in bringing the
litigation.
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did not purchase all of the study materials. As McLean acknowledged, he was not fully prepared, but plaintiffs charged ahead
despite the obvious problems with McLean's case.67
The magistrate judge's observation comes close to suggesting that
an employer might have an affirmative defense if a plaintiff failed
to study for an exam; however, that issue was not squarely before
the court, and the justification for this conclusion is conspicuously
absent.
More recently, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Anderson v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co.6 8 shows that some courts do ask
whether factors other than race can explain a statistical disparity.
Although not specifically addressing plaintiffs' lack of preparation,
Anderson involved several black workers who brought a variety of
hiring and promotion claims against a large employer.6 9 Many of the
plaintiffs asserted that the employer's criteria for promotion had a
disparate impact by race, although there were numerous disparate
treatment claims as well.7" The plaintiffs produced evidence that the
percentage of black candidates who succeeded at each of three
stages in a particular promotion process was lower than statistically
expected, and sought to use this evidence to support a disparate
impact claim.7 1 The court concluded, however, that:
This evidence does not show that the reason black applicants
failed to proceed at the interview selection stage and position
selection stage was their race. Factors such as presentation in
the interview, answers to interview questions, demeanor, and
ability demonstrated in the interview of course entered into the
judgment of the members of the panel as to the candidate who
received a position that was being filled. And, at the interview
selection stage, for example, education and experience are two
[the plaintiffs' statistical expert's] analysis fails to
factors that
72
quantify.
67. Id. at 1212 n.7 (citations omitted).
68. 406 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2005).
69. See id. at 258-59.

70. See id.
71. See id. at 261-62, 265.
72. Id. at 266 (emphasis added). Judge Gregory, in dissent, took issue with this
conclusion. Id. at 280-82 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
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The opinion seems to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
racial disparity they complain about remains even after controlling
for other factors such as demeanor, presentation, and so on. Such
"other factors" would surely have to include a lack of preparation or
effort by the applicants, although the Anderson court's approach
would seem to encompass many other variables in addition to effort
or training.7 3
The clearest recognition of the potential two-party or interactional
nature of disparate impact harm comes from the re-hearing of
Lanning, 4 discussed earlier. The Third Circuit initially remanded
the case for further hearing on the issue of whether SEPTA's
cutoff score, 12 minutes for a 1.5 mile run, measured "the minimum
aerobic capacity necessary to perform successfully the job of a
SEPTA transit police officer."75 On remand, the district court
concluded that the defendant had established that its cutoff score
was appropriate under this standard, and on rehearing, a divided
panel agreed that the cutoff score was appropriately set.76 At the
very conclusion of its opinion, almost as an afterthought, the court
noted that:
[I]n addition to those women who could pass the test without
training, nearly all the women who trained were able to pass
after only a moderate amount of training. It is not, we think,
unreasonable to expect that women-and men-who wish to
become SEPTA transit officers, and are committed to dealing
with issues of public safety on a day-to-day basis, would take
this necessary step. Moreover, we do not consider it unreasonable for SEPTA to require applicants, who wish to train to meet
73. Indeed, Anderson goes someway towards collapsing the distinction between disparate
impact and disparate treatment analysis altogether. At the limit, if a racial disparity in pass
rates only counts as evidence of a disparate impact when all other factors-besides race-have
been considered and rejected, then we will have eliminated the distinction between disparate
impact and pattern and practice theories of discrimination. For example, it seems clear that
Griggs would have come out the other way if the Court had used the reasoning of Anderson.
The Griggs plaintiffs never even sought to demonstrate that the reason black applicants
disproportionately failed the IQ test was their race. Perhaps the reason for the disparity was
that the black test takers had fewer years of education or a lower quality of schooling than
most of the white test takers.
74. Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning11), 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 288.
76. See id. at 288, 292.
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the job requirements, to do so before applying in order to
demonstrate their commitment to physical fitness."

Although Lanning II did hint at the possibility of a reasonable
efforts defense, it is clear from the rest of the six-page opinion that
the failure to train by some female applicants was at most a
secondary factor supporting the majority's analysis.7"
Contrerasv. City of Los Angeles7" is the only other case that takes
on the failure to train issue directly. Plaintiffs were Hispanic city
employees who failed a written examination that was required for
retention after the city reorganized their department."0 The trial
court found that the plaintiffs had failed to study for the exam,"' and
held that this lack of preparation vitiated the plaintiffs' prima facie
case of discrimination. 2 The Ninth Circuit agreed, concluding that
"the impeachment of the [pass rate] statistics by evidence of the
accountants' failure to study, [among other things,] convince[s] us
that the district court's conclusion was not an unreasonable
interpretation of the evidence presented." 3 Without explicitly saying
so, the Contreras court seems to endorse the proposition that
Id. at 292.
See id. at 292-93.
656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1271.
As the court explained:
Facts stipulated by the parties include the statement of a City official that [the
plaintiff] accountants confessed to lack of preparation at a meeting held to air
accountants' complaints about the examination.... The same City official who
revealed accountants' admission to their lack of study filed a report describing
the meeting at which the admission occurred. That report, prepared several
months before accountants filed a complaint in the district court, related
plausible reasons for their failure to study: they believed not only that the voters
would pass [a] charter amendment exempting them from the examination
requirements, but also that they would receive a second opportunity to take the
examination if the amendment failed.
That accountants failed to prepare adequately for the examination is
corroborated by their examination performance. Their average examination
score, aside from being well below the established passing score, was 11.58
percent below the average score of the other 13 Spanish-surnamed applicants
who took the test. Moreover, they scored well below the average Spanishsurnamed score in every examination category.
Id. at 1273-74.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1274.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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plaintiffs cannot even make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact if the reason for their failure on the examination was their
own lack of preparation. 4
2. No DisparateImpact for Easily Mutable Characteristics
Further support for the idea of a duty to train comes from the
analysis of disparate impacts caused by easily mutable characteristics. Courts have addressed a number of contexts in which a
workplace rule has a disparate impact on protected-class members,
but those impacts can be overcome at low costs to the workers
themselves. These cases are generally consistent with my proposed
rule governing training for tests: disparate impacts that can be
surmounted or eliminated by low-cost alterations in plaintiffs'
behavior are generally not held to be a basis for liability. Put
another way, these cases generally conclude that disparate impact
plaintiffs are obliged to mitigate the harms of the impact-creating
rule they are challenging when they could do so easily. Only those
impacts that are not easily overcome by plaintiffs can be a source of
employer liability.
Garciav. Spun Steak Co.5 provides one example of this kind of
reasoning. The case concerned a disparate impact challenge to an
employer's English-only work rule by several bilingual employees.8"
In rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, the court observed that:

84. This conclusion is both stronger and weaker than the standard I propose below.
Contrerasseems to stand for the proposition that non-studying plaintiffs are ineligible to sue
for disparate impact, but not for the broader implication that the failure to study can be used
to attack the existence of the disparity altogether, which is what I propose. On the other hand,
the Contrerascourt suggested that plaintiffs' failure to study doomed their prima facie case.
Under my proposal, non-studying plaintiffs could maintain a prima facie case, but employers
could rebut more easily by showing only job relatedness, and not business necessity. Note too
that my standard would allow for a cost-justified failure to study, whereas Contrerasdoes not
address the costs of training at all.
85. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). Charles A. Sullivan briefly discusses-disapprovinglywhat he terms an emerging "volitional exception" to disparate impact liability when
disparities are due to circumstances that a plaintiff can easily control. See Charles A.
Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: DisparateImpact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1505, 1562-63 (2004).
86. See Garcia,998 F.2d at 1483-84.
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The bilingual employee can readily comply with the English-only
rule and still enjoy the privilege of speaking on the job. "There
is no disparate impact" with respect to a privilege of employment
"if the rule is one that the affected employee can readily observe
and nonobservance is a matter of individual preference."87
By extension, this principle would seem to imply that plaintiffs who
could readily pass an exam if they trained for it, but did not do so,
might not have a sustainable disparate impact claim.
Similarly, plaintiffs occasionally prevail on disparate impact
challenges to employer grooming or dress codes, but only when
compliance with the rules is difficult for race- or gender-contingent
reasons.88 More often, courts find that when plaintiffs can comply
with prohibitions such as those against long or braided hair at
relatively low cost, there is no disparate impact. 89 A typical example
of this reasoning is Batson v. Powell,9" in which the court rejected
the plaintiffs' gender-based disparate impact challenge to their
employer's dress code, remarking that 'Title VII protects classes
defined by certain immutable traits identified by statute and
possessed by certain individuals. Traits or factors specifically within
an individual's control are not necessarily protected." 91
There may be strong diversity and other grounds for concluding
that altering one's dress or hairstyle is in fact more burdensome
than the courts cited above seemed to assume. I am not concerned
with the correctness of these decisions, however, as much as the
principle they endorse: if plaintiffs can overcome a disparate impact
at little cost to themselves, they should be required to do so. That is
precisely the line I wish to take as regards training for a test.

87. Id. at 1487 (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)).
88. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining
that employer's "no-beard policy" had a disparate impact on black males because of
pseudofolliculitis barbae, a skin condition affecting African American men that makes shaving
difficult, and was not justified by business necessity).
89. See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("An allbraided hairstyle is an 'easily changed characteristic,' and, even if socioculturally associated
with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the
application of employment practices by an employer." (citing Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269)).
90. 912 F. Supp. 565 (D.D.C. 1996).
91. Id. at 572.
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3. No PlaintiffContributionto DisparateImpacts
At least one case seems to suggest that there can be nothing
resembling a 'lack of effort" defense to a disparate impact claim,
because no other factors may be considered apart from the raw
racial disparity giving rise to the disparate impact claim.9 2 Under
this view, disparate impacts are inherently one-sided. In Association
of Mexican-American Educators(AMAE) v. California,the court set
out to assess the explanation for why, on average, minority plaintiffs had lower scores than whites on the state-mandated test used
to screen public school teachers.9 3 In doing so, the court noted that:
[P]reparation factors [appear to] play a strong role in a candidate's performance on the [test], regardless of the candidate's
race or ethnicity.
Nevertheless, this analysis is entirely irrelevant to the issue
of adverse impact. It does not matter why the disparate impact
exists. Defendants cannot escape liability by showing that the
disparate impact is attributable to particular background
"[T]he whole point of a disparate impact challenge is
factors ....
that a facially non-discriminatory employment or promotion
device-in this case an examination-has a discriminatory effect.
It would be odd indeed if a defendant whose facially nondiscriminatory examination which has a disparate impact could
escape the obligation to validate the examination merely by
pointing to some other facially non-discriminatory factor that
correlates with the disparate impact."94
A careful reading, however, reveals that AMAE v. Californiadoes
not speak directly to the issues I have been considering for two
reasons. First, it is clear from the context of the litigation that
"preparation factors" meant the plaintiffs' general level of education,
experience, and English-language proficiency, rather than their
92. See Ass'n of Mex.-Am. Educators v. California (AMAE), 937 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1410 (emphasis added except "why," "effect," and "other") (quoting Bouman v.
Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1228 (9th Cir. 1990)). Note the obvious contrast with Anderson v.
Westinghouse SavannahRiver, Inc., 406 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2005), discussed supra notes 68-73
and accompanying text.
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efforts to train or prepare specifically for the test at issue. 95 There
is an important-although not always clear-distinction between
general background factors and individual-specific factors, such as
lack of effort, that influence the probability of passing tests. I argue
below that it is not appropriate to impose on plaintiffs the costs of
compensating for general background factors that have the effect of
disadvantaging their particular group.96 One might nevertheless
wish for plaintiffs to make reasonable efforts to train for a particular test, regardless of whether the reasonable efforts turned out to
be successful.9 7
The second limitation of the AMAE analysis is more narrowly
legal. Because the test at issue in AMAE had a disparate impact
on minorities, the defendant assumed the burden of showing that
in spite of this disparity the test was job related and justified by
business necessity."

The court in AMAE

was concerned with

whether this burden could be obviated by evidence that the
disparity was based on other factors besides minority status per
se.99 The Court held that a benign explanation for the disparity does
not eliminate the requirement that the test be job related.'0 0 But for
95. Imagine that we had data on each applicant's test score and a variety of other
attributes-race, age, education, prior experience, and so on. An analysis of disparate impact
by race would seem to require that we ignore all these other attributes, even if a regression
equation that predicted test scores would perform better-and would probably show a smaller
race effect-if age, education, etc. were included in addition to race. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Three
Tests for Measuring Unjustified DisparateImpacts in Organ Transplantation:The Problem
of "Included-Variable"Bias, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S68, S70-73 (2005). But see Robert
Bornholz & James J. Heckman, Measuring Disparate Impacts and Extending Disparate
Impact Doctrine to OrganTransplantation(NBER Working Paper No. 10946,2004), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10946. That is because disparate impact-unlike disparate
treatment-is generally concerned with effects, not the reasons for those effects. A test that
disqualifies a disproportionate number of minorities can still be subject to disparate impact
liability, even if the "real" reason for the disparity is that minority teachers attended poorer
quality schools, are younger, or have less experience than their white counterparts. See Ayres,
supra at S70-73.
96. So, for example, although the plaintiffs in Griggs could have obtained a high school
diploma, the cost of doing so for African Americans in North Carolina in the early 1960s would
have been prohibitively high. See infra Part V for further discussion.
97. Thus, we might want the Lanningplaintiffs to show that they made reasonable efforts
to pass the running test, even if those efforts would not have been successful, as was
suggested in Lanning II. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning11), 308
F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002).
98. See AMAE, 937 F. Supp. at 1410.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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our purposes, the important question is whether lack of training or
effort can defeat liability for disparate impact, not whether such
behavior can defeat the job relatedness requirement.1 1 In other
words, AMAE is consistent with the argument advanced here: a
defendant must show that the challenged test was job related before
being allowed to raise a defense that the plaintiffs did not undertake
sufficient reasonable effort in preparing for the test or in taking the
test itself.
To summarize, almost none of the existing case law squarely
addresses the question of whether there is any defense to a
disparate impact claim based on a plaintiff's lack of effort or
preparation to meet a job requirement.1 2 A few cases suggest in
dicta that individual disparate impact plaintiffs might be disqualified if they failed to make reasonable efforts to prepare or train for
a test, although no cases expressly reach this holding. A few others
suggest that no explanatory factors-presumably including lack of
preparation-can be used to excuse a disparity. But these cases do
not deal with the effort or preparation issue directly, focusing
instead on general background factors such as educational attainment. In the end it seems that there is opportunity to speculate
about what the law should be.
There are two ways to answer this question, doctrinally or with
a policy-based approach. A doctrinal approach first reasons from
principles, including statutory construction and legal analogies. I
attempt an analysis of this kind in Part III. A policy, or consequentialist, approach begins by imagining what real world
behaviors the law is seeking to encourage or discourage, and then
reasons backward to the legal rules that best promote such behavior. I present an analysis in this spirit in Part IV. Both approaches
101. AMAE was quoted approvingly and at length in a more recent disparate impact case,
Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., 236 F. Supp. 2d 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), but the issue there was whether
the plaintiffs' "expert's failure to consider ... variables (other than race/ethnicity] render[ed]
his report of little or no probative worth." Id. at 340. The court concluded that in a disparate
impact claim, "there is no requirement that plaintiffs control for variables other than race and
ethnicity in their statistical proof." Id. at 341. For example, if black applicants have fewer
years of education than white applicants, controlling for years of education in a regression
explaining test scores would probably make the inter-race difference look smaller, because
some of the apparent racial disparities would be explained by differences in education by race.
102. Lindemann and Grossman's comprehensive treatise makes no mention of these issues
at all. See lUNDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35.
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reach the same conclusion, albeit by different routes: we should
not hold employers liable for an employment practice that has a
disparate impact when applicants, at low cost to themselves, could
have eliminated the harm they suffered but failed to do so.
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE
TWO-PARTY PROBLEM

To understand how disparate impact doctrine should address
instances of two-party causality, it is helpful to understand the
rationale for disparate impact doctrine. °3 Three major rationales
have been proposed: proxy for motive, distributive justice, and
remedying past discrimination. I discuss each in turn.
A. Proxy for Motive
An employer's intent or purpose in adopting a particular employment practice is usually difficult to discern and even more difficult
to prove. Especially in the immediate aftermath of Title VII, it was
entirely reasonable to suspect that employers might seek to hide
behind facially neutral job requirements such as a high school
diploma or an IQ test in order to preserve segregation. Disparate
impact might thus be thought of as a way to ferret out discriminatory intent when an illicit motive is likely, but is impossible to
demonstrate given the evidentiary burdens that Title VII plaintiffs

face. 104
"Judging intent by effects" is certainly a plausible justification for
disparate impact liability, although it is problematic in several
respects. 10 5 At any rate, the covert motive theory seems largely
103. For an imaginative recent analysis of the constitutional basis for disparate impact, see
Primus, supra note 4. Primus's analysis is not germane here, however, because this Article
takes the constitutionality of disparate impact as a given.

104. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1, 29 (1976) (arguing that disparate impact should be used "selectively ... to
create rebuttable ... presumptions of discriminatory intent").
105. For instance, it seems strongly at odds with the holding in Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982). At issue in Teal was a test that disqualified a greater number of black than
white applicants for promotion to supervisor in the state's welfare eligibility department; the
white pass rate was 79.5 percent, whereas the black rate was 54.2 percent, for a relative rate
of 68 percent. Id. at 444 n.4. The State attempted to compensate for the disparity at the
testing stage by promoting 11 of the 26 black test passers (42 percent) and only 35 of the 206
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consistent with a "lack of effort" defense to disparate impact claims.
If some or all applicants demonstrably fail to make reasonable
efforts to pass or train for a test, then some or all of the observed
disparity in results should obviously be attributed to the applicants
themselves, rather than reflecting any hidden bias on the part of the
employer. In Lanning, for example, it is hard to reconcile the
employer's offer of training and its letter urging applicants to take
advantage of the training program with a covert desire to exclude
women. Moreover, even if the test had been intended to disqualify
female candidates, it would have been less effective in achieving this
goal, if the plaintiffs had made more effort to train for the test,
thereby raising their pass rate. "Judging intent by effects" is simply
less persuasive when there is a credible alternative reason for the
disparity that has nothing to do with the employer's intent. That is
exactly the case when applicants fail to make reasonable efforts."OS
In sum, the "proxy for intent" theory suggests that disparate
impact liability is not justified when the disparity at issue is
substantially the result of the applicant's failure to make reasonable
efforts, precisely because the plaintiffs behavior, rather than the
defendant's discriminatory intent, is likely to have caused some or
all of the disparity.

white test passers (17 percent). Id. at 443. Overall, black applicants had a 23 percent chance
of getting the job, while white applicants had a 14 percent chance, a relative rate of 170
percent. Because the overall, or "bottom-line," results strongly favored blacks, it is hard to
argue that the State was using the test in a covert effort to exclude black applicants. Under
any motive-based theory, therefore, it would seem that no disparate impact liability should
obtain-and yet the Court rejected a "bottom-line" theory of defense. See id. at 442.
106. Of course, it is possible that the employer knew that women would have a harder time
passing the test without training, guessed that they would not train, and selected the test for
the purpose of keeping women off the force. That seems implausible in the Lanning context,
given SEPTA's extensive efforts to validate the test before it was adopted, the obvious
relevance of a running test for police officers, and the long history of using such tests. See
generally Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning1), 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999).
Such suspicions obviously cannot be completely ruled out based on the available record,
however. The point is merely that if disparate impact is supposed to guard against suspected,
but difficult to prove, intentional discrimination, these facts do not make out a strong case for
its use.
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B. Group Rights/DistributiveJustice
Another plausible justification for disparate impact liability is
that it is a way to alter the allocation of jobs to achieve a more fair
distribution of resources among groups. For instance, if a test or
high school graduation requirement for jobs at Duke Power Plant
leaves African Americans with a smaller percentage of jobs than
they should have, then disparate impact liability provides a means
to expunge the screening mechanism so as to create a more fair
allocation."10
Once again, this line of reasoning seems entirely compatible
with, or even to support, a "lack of effort" defense. Unless one
believes that groups have a per se entitlement to some share of the
jobs at issue, a group's average effort to prepare would seem to be
relevant in any determination of what its share ought to be.
Common sense notions of fairness traditionally rest on the idea of
treating equals equally. Thus, it is hard to see why effort should be
irrelevant in determining what constitutes a fair outcome. 0 8 Only
on a pure group rights or quota theory would effort be irrelevant-each group would be entitled to a share of the jobs at issue
purely by virtue of its share in the labor force or the population.
However, the cases are replete with fervent exhortations not to
regard disparate impact as a form of covert hiring quotas.'0 9
107. Under this view, disparate impact is a variant of affirmative action. See, e.g., Primus,
supra note 4, at 524-25 (arguing that "disparate impact law is a cousin of affirmative action");
David A. Strauss, The Myth of Color Blindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99. Quite apart from the
obvious difficulties in determining what a fair allocation of jobs across groups would look like,
Teal again seems fatal to this justification. Blacks ultimately obtained 24 percent of the jobs,
even though they comprised only 16 percent of the applicant pool. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text. This is hardly unfair to the plaintiffs, but the Court nevertheless found
in their favor.
108. One could press further: disparate impact doctrine treats protected-class applicants
as a homogenous group. But in conferring a benefit on protected-class applicants who failed
the test, disparate impact liability will often disadvantage those protected-class applicants
who passed the test, as they now have a larger pool of competitors for a limited number of job
vacancies.
109. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that disparate impact liability could lead
to pressure to hire on a quota system, and has suggested that this is not only undesirable but
also inconsistent with its definition of disparate impact:
[T]oday's extension of [disparate impact liability] into the context of subjective
selection practices could increase the risk that employers will be given

548

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:515

Moreover, almost no one argues that qualifications are irrelevant,
or that the appropriate baseline against which disparities should be
measured is a group's share of the overall population. Rather, courts
have consistently used the "qualified labor pool" as the relevant
baseline in assessing disparities,"' which implies that the pure
group rights theory cannot be the explanation for disparate impact
liability.
C. Remedying Past Discrimination
Another view of disparate impact is that it is a remedy not for
present unfairness, but for past discriminatory practices that have
present effects. The purpose of the doctrine, on this account, is to
bar any employment criteria that translate previous discriminatory
practices, such as unequal provision of public education or segregated employment, into current labor market outcomes. Recall that
the court in Griggs was particularly concerned with "remov[ing]
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees.""' This "structural"
perspective views disparate impact liability as a way to sever the

incentives to adopt quotas or to engage in preferential treatment.... [However,]
the evidentiary standards that apply in these cases should serve as adequate
safeguards against the danger [of quotas].
Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988). The Court's attitude towards
quotas reflects congressional language in Title VII, which states that:
Nothing contained in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer...
to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any
employer ...
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State,
section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 20e-20j) (2000).
110. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1271-72 (lth Cir. 2000) (rejecting
the district court's characterization of the qualified labor pool as 31.9 percent female, and
suggesting that the gender composition of the actual applicants-roughly 22 percent
female-was the appropriate baseline against which disparities in hiring rates should be
measured).
111. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
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connection between past discrimination against a group and current
unfavorable outcomes. 1 2
This seems to be one of the stronger rationales for disparate
impact liability. It appeals to a widespread recognition that
structural barriers-such as the difficulties some groups have
experienced obtaining an education-play a major role in group
disadvantage, and disallows practices that rely on such barriers
unless they are shown to be necessary from the employer's perspective." 3
Despite the appeal of the structural barriers argument, it is
difficult to analogize asking job applicants to make reasonable
efforts to train for a test to the kind of pre-existing structural
barrier that disparate impact liability was designed to combat. A
test is not really a barrier-and is hardly an unfair one-if it can be
passed with reasonable effort or training.
Past disadvantage may make it more difficult for some groups to
pass a test than for others. For example, African Americans had less
access than whites to a high school education in the Jim Crow
South, so high school diploma requirements posed a severe barrier
112. Whatever its attraction on the merits, it is not clear that this structural analysis
comports with Title VII's original prohibition of discrimination. For instance, Michael Sovern,
a pro-civil rights scholar writing just after Title VII went into effect, argued explicitly that the
statute was not designed to solve general social problems:
In a southern school district, for example, training in metal trades may be
available in the white, but not in the Negro, vocational school; as a result, when
a local metal-working shop advertises for high school seniors with metal-trades
training, there is a sense in which it is discriminating against Negroes. But
section 703(h) makes it clear that this is not the sense in which Title VII uses
the word "discriminate." To violate Title VII, one must treat differently because
of race itself and not merely because of an applicant's lack of qualification which
he was prevented from acquiring because of his race.
MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 71 (1966).
113. But consider a police department's height or weight requirements, which invariably
have a disparate impact by gender. Many police departments discriminated against women
in the past, but it is not clear that height or weight requirements constituted a structural
barrier that excluded women. In fact, before Title VII, height or weight requirements were not
deployed against women; departments simply refused to hire them outright. Rather, the
requirements were directed against-and had the effect of eliminating-short or overweight
men. Consequently, banning these requirements does not really seem to be severing a
structural link. One could plausibly argue that the requirements themselves now constitute
sex discrimination, but use of disparate impact liability to eliminate ongoing discrimination
cannot be justified by a rationale based solely on the existence of structural barriers created
bypast discrimination. Elimination of ongoing discrimination comports better with the "proxy
for intent" rationale discussed supra in Part III.A.
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for blacks in 1965, a barrier one could not reasonably have asked
them to overcome.114 Some requirements, such as a minimum height
standard, are virtually impossible to overcome with any amount of
effort. But the standard I propose below does not require superhuman or impossible efforts, only some version of reasonable effort.
Reasonable effort is exactly what the plaintiffs apparently failed to
undertake in Lanning.Likewise, the Contrerasplaintiffs apparently
made no effort at all. 1 5
There is nothing "structural" about asking victims of discrimination to make reasonable efforts to overcome barriers they encounter.
If a written test has a disparate impact even on those who studied
hard, or a timed run disqualifies a larger number of women than
men even when the women undertook reasonable preparation, then
a structural analysis would seem to apply and the practice would
presumptively be subject to liability under a disparate impact standard. But where applicants fail to make reasonable efforts, it is
more difficult to justify forcing employers to eliminate the test or
requirement as a structural barrier to advancement. The very idea
of a "structural" barrier implies an obstacle that individuals cannot
overcome whereas, in stark contrast, it is precisely the reasonably
"overcomeable" obstacles that are the focus of a reasonable effort
requirement.
In short, the existing doctrinal or jurisprudential theories
justifying disparate impact liability support-or are at least
compatible with-a "lack of effort" defense. It is also possible to
approach the problem under a more consequentialist framework.
The next Part undertakes this task.
IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY WITH
TWO-PARTY CAUSATION

Disparate impact doctrine does not fit comfortably into the
standard economic model of tort liability" 6 because it is neither a
114. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
115. See infra Part V for a discussion on how to implement a more precise version of the
reasonable effort standard.
116. The only literature to view employment discrimination through the lens of the
economic theory of accident law is Amy Wax, Discriminationas Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129
(1999). Wax focuses only on disparate treatment, but her analysis has some important points
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strict liability nor a negligence standard. One might analogize
disparate impact's test validation/job relatedness requirement to the
standard of care under a negligence rule. But the analogy is
attenuated because even careful validation does not immunize a test
from liability for disparate impact if the use of the test is not
justified by business necessity. A further difference between
disparate impact and either strict liability or negligence is that, for
tests with a disparate impact, the effects of applicant training are
inherently interactive, and hence not analogous to the atomistic
"care" decisions of individual victims in the standard accident
model. Put another way, female applicant Xs preparation for the
test creates a positive benefit for her employer and a negative
benefit for her fellow applicants. Additional training by X increases
the expected pass rate for female applicants as a group, decreases
the expected disparity vis-A-vis white males, and thus lowers the
employer's expected liability. X's training simultaneously works to
the detriment of the other female applicants, for two reasons. First,
it means that her rivals are likely to score worse than Xon the test.
Second, it lowers the likelihood of a female/male disparity that could
provide other women with grounds for litigation if they fail the test.
Given the tenuous analogy between disparate impact liability and
the standard tort model, I focus instead on a positive description
and a crude normative, or welfare, analysis of the effects of disparate impact liability on applicant effort. I conclude tentatively that
a reasonable efforts requirement is likely to be welfare-enhancing,
albeit largely for somewhat non-standard reasons.
A. The Effects of DisparateImpact Liability on Effort by
Applicants
1. Ex Ante Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is the tendency for parties to take less care in the
presence of insurance that cushions their downside risk." 7 Is it
of similarity with my analysis of disparate impact liability.
117. Kenneth J. Arrow is credited with introducing this concept into modern economic
analysis in Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941
(1963). For an intellectual history of the term and analysis of its modern (mis)applications,
see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237 (1996).
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plausible that applicants might not train for a test because of the
possibility that, should they fail, they could nonetheless recover
something if the test is found to have a disparate impact? On this
view, disparate impact liability could be seen as offering a kind of
insurance that reduces the losses an applicant might otherwise
expect to suffer from failing the test.
Although possible, such a moral hazard explanation does not
seem especially plausible in the context of disparate impact liability.
First, it is hard to believe that prevailing disparate impact plaintiffs
are fully compensated by the awards they typically receive. The
absence of full compensation means that disparate impact liability
inherently involves some kind of uninsured loss or co-payment for
the residual harm not covered by the defendant's liability, which in
turn gives victims at least some financial incentive to pass the test.
More significantly, many applicants are probably unaware of the
possibility of disparate impact liability before they take a test. And
even those applicants who know about the doctrine have to decide
whether to prepare for the test without knowing whether it will in
fact produce a disparity at all, let alone a disparity that a court will
subsequently recognize as giving rise to liability."'
An applicant's rational calculus about whether to train for a test
might, therefore, look something like Figure ." 9 Suppose that a
risk-neutral applicant who passes the test is guaranteed to get the
job, which is worth 100. Training costs 10, and raises the probability
of passing from 30 percent to 40.5 percent-hence, training has a
positive expected value of 0.5 units ((0.405 x 100) - 10 - (0.3 x 100)).
If there is no disparate impact liability, the applicant will thus find
it in her interest to train for the test, because the expected value of
doing so is 30.5 units, whereas the expected value of not training is
only 30 units.

118. The defendant's liability depends, among other things, on the care with which the test
was validated, whether the test is necessary to the employer's business, and on the intergroup
disparity in pass rates. See generally Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975);
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993); Gillespie v. Wisconsin, 771 F.2d
1035 (7th Cir. 1985). None of these could be known to applicants at the time they take the
test. Therefore, if disparate impact doctrine provides plaintiffs a kind of insurance, it is highly
probabilistic insurance at best.
119. The decision tree is meant to be illustrative rather than realistic.
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Figure 1: Decision To Train, Without Potential Disparate Impact
Liability
Now introduce the possibility of disparate impact liability, as
depicted in Figure 2: if the applicant fails, she can sue under a
disparate impact theory, and if she does, there is a 10 percent
chance that she will prevail. A prevailing plaintiff, however, only
recovers 80 percent of the benefits she would receive if she
actually got the job (on the theory that awards are generally undercompensatory). The expected payoff from training for the test is
now (-10 + (0.405 x 100)) + (0.595 x 0.1 x 80) = 35.26, whereas the
expected payoff from not training is ((0.3 x 100) + (0.7 x 0.1 x 80))
= 35.6. The possibility of disparate impact liability has raised the
expected payoff from not training by more than it raised the payoff
120
from training, thus making it optimal not to train for the test.

120. I assume risk-neutrality, and abstract away all of the strategic aspects of this problem.
For example, the probability of disparate impact liability depends on the training decision of
all other female applicants because if all others train there will be a much lower likelihood
of a gender disparity in the first instance.
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Figure 2: Decision To Train With Potential Disparate Impact
Liability and No Duty To Train
But this scenario seems out of line with the stylized facts in
Lanning, and with what I take to be common sense. If we believe
the expert quoted by Judge Weiss, women who trained for the
running test would have raised their probability of passing from
something like 12 percent, the actual pass rate for women in
Lanning, to 40 percent.' 2 ' For these parameters, the ex ante probability of a disparate impact victory would have to be at least 80
percent, a completely unrealistic figure, in order for the female
applicants to find it no longer in their self-interest to undertake the
training.
Generally, this highly speculative exercise lends support to the
conclusion that when training is relatively costly and not very
effective, disparate impact liability may lead some applicants to
forego it. It is certainly possible to concoct stylized examples in
which this effect occurs. But as long as training has a reasonably
significant expected return, the existence of disparate impact
121. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (LanningI),181 F.3d 478,495 (3d Cir.
1999) (Weiss, J., dissenting). Of course, we do not know much about the costs or benefits of
training, so knowing about its efficacy alone is not very helpful. My parameters imply a 180
percent return on training. Judge Weiss did suggest that only eight weeks of "moderate
training" would be sufficient for the average sedentary woman to be able to pass the test. See
id.
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liability is unlikely to make training unattractive, simply because
the probability of prevailing in subsequent litigation--estimated
before the applicant has to make a decision about whether to
undertake training-is likely to be quite low. Focusing on ex ante
moral hazard, therefore, seems unrealistic in this context because
rational applicants will usually want to undertake training when
training has substantial benefits and relatively low costs.
2. Ex Post Moral Hazard
What seems more plausible, however, is an analog of ex post
moral hazard. In the medical context, ex ante moral hazard
describes the effect of insurance on patients' decisions about how
much care to take; ex post moral hazard describes the effect of
insurance on doctor visits, prescription drug use, and other decisions
patients make after they have chosen how much effort to devote to
staying healthy.'22 In our setting, ex post moral hazard describes
the decision by applicants who have not prepared for the test 123 to
file suit alleging disparate impact. Eliminating the possibility of
recovery for plaintiffs who do not train for the test may strengthen
incentives to undertake training, but its main effect would clearly
be to eliminate the incentive to litigate among those who have not
trained. If an employee knows she cannot possibly prevail, she is
unlikely to sue in the first instance.'2 4
122. In the health insurance context, the major concern is obviously ex post, rather than
ex ante, moral hazard. For a persuasive dissenting view on the importance of ex post moral
hazard in health care, see John A. Nyman, The Economics of Moral HazardRevisited, 18 J.
HEALTH ECON. 811 (1999) (arguing that the increase in benefit takeup in the presence of
health insurance is a welfare-enhancing income effect, not a welfare-reducing moral hazard).
In contrast, see Dhaval Dave & Robert Kaestner, Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral
Hazard:Evidence from Medicare, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12764,
2006), available at www.nber.org/papers/W12764 (finding that health insurance reduces
prevention and increases unhealthy behaviors among the elderly, but that physician
counseling is also successful in changing health behaviors).
123. Some of these will be persons who have unusually high training costs or low returns
from getting the job. Others will be persons who mistakenly believe that they can pass
without training, or simply suffer from some lapse of judgment or weakness of will. See, e.g.,
Thomas C. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 PUB. INT. 94 (1980). Other
litigants may be overly optimistic about the probability of a disparate impact victory.
124. A reasonable efforts defense would obviously make it much harder for an applicant
who chose not to train to prevail in her disparate impact claim. I ignore any possible indirect
effects from the introduction of a reasonable efforts defense. For example, employers might
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Return to the example of Figure 2, but suppose that one-half of
the applicants have a cost of training of 9 and half have a cost of 11.
The low training cost applicants will always find it worthwhile to
train, whereas the high training cost applicants will never find it
worthwhile.'2 5 Suppose there are 1000 applicants, 500 of each type,
and consider the makeup of the pool of litigants. Of the 500 low-cost
applicants, all will choose to train, and 59 percent of them (295) will
fail the test and sue. Of the high-cost applicants, none will choose to
train, and 70 percent (350) will fail the test and sue. A duty to train
would eliminate this latter group of litigants, who comprise 54
percent of the total,'2 6 even though the new rule would have no
effect on anyone's ex ante training decision.
In sum, a duty to train might induce some applicants to train
more and would reduce the number of potential plaintiffs who go on
to sue. Ultimately, however, the normative case for implementing
a duty to train does not rest on either of those factors.
B. Normative Analysis
1. Offsetting Benefits and the Measure of Harm
Suppose driver X runs over pedestrian Ys foot with his car. The
legal system could of course shift that loss back to the injurer, to an
insurance company, to the public at large-or it could decide to
leave the loss where it lies, with the injured victim. No matter who
bears the loss, however, there is one fewer foot in the world after the
accident than before. This is significant because it means that the
optimal level of accidents is the one that minimizes the sum of
expected accident costs and accident prevention costs, whoever
least in the classic account, distributhese end up falling upon. At
127
tion of loss does not matter.
be prompted to increase the net benefits of training by holding exercise classes or coaching
sessions. This might further encourage applicants to train because it eliminates employer
liability to any applicants who failed to train when doing so would have been reasonable.
125. There would be no incentive for the high-cost applicants to train even if the probability
of prevailing on a disparate impact suit were one, so there is no ex ante moral hazard.
126. See infra Part V, on implementing the duty to train. I assume that applicants would
be required to make a reasonable effort-couched in objective, rather than subjective terms-so
that the high-cost trainers would still be required to train.
127. There is a large and increasingly sophisticated sub-literature on the use of tort law
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Failing a test does not constitute a social cost in this sense,
however, because at least some of the social cost of failing is
inherently distributional, and is therefore entirely separate from the
harm experienced by the test-failer herself. Suppose Y is an
applicant who fails a test, rather than a pedestrian with an injured
foot. Ys individual, private injury-the cost to her of failing to get
the job--cannot be a direct measure of the social loss, because her
failure necessarily means that some other applicant, Z, will get
the job instead. At least as a first approximation, the gain to Z will
offset the loss to Y, leaving no net effect at all.
Two additional sources of cost need to be considered, however. To
the extent that the test is useful to the employer because it allows
for better matching of individuals to jobs, the employer may have a
stake in whether Yor Z gets the job. Moreover, there may be some
social costs, above and beyond these private costs, from one person
passing rather than another. Suppose that Y is female and Z is
male. For a variety of reasons discussed earlier, society may have a
stake in Y getting the job rather than Z. The point is that society's
interest in Y getting the job bears no obvious relationship to Ys
private interest-it could be larger or smaller than Ys stake.
This potential disparity means, however, that any normative
analysis in this context is extremely tricky. Suppose, for example,
that either Yor Z would gain $10 if they got the job, but that society
attaches a value of $2 to Y getting the position rather than Z. It
might seem to follow that Y (and Z) have an excessive incentive to
invest in obtaining the position, since both will trade off the private
benefits, $10, against the private costs of training for the test. If
both Y and Z invest $9 to secure the position, which Y ultimately
gets, the winner will have $1 of private surplus and the loser will
have a $9 private loss. Society, however, will realize a net loss of $6
(2 + 1 - 9)128
as a distributional mechanism, especially in the presence of inefficiencies in the tax system.
See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, David Fortus & Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and
Tax Rules in Income Redistribution:A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125
(2004); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGALSTUD. 667 (1994); Chris William Sanchirico,
Deconstructingthe New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1003 (2001).
128. This is a classic example of a positional goods/prisoner's dilemma problem. See, e.g.,
ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND (1985) (arguing that humans have a tendency
to overinvest in zero-sum, positional contests). In this context, a reduction in training might
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Alternatively, suppose that society valued Y getting the job at
$10, while Yand Zvalued it at $2 each. If Yand Zeach invest $1 to
secure the position, which Y ultimately gets, there is a net welfare
gain of $10 (10 + 1 - 1). Everything depends on the relative size of
private and social gains from allocating the position. Moreover,
training is likely to have directly productive as well as distributional
effects; regardless of who gets the job, the successful applicant
129
might actually perform better as a result of having trained.
Finally, the positional nature of the competition also depends on
the employer's procedure for selecting applicants. If the employer
chooses among applicants based on their scores, then applicants
may have a perverse incentive to maximize their scores. On the
other hand, a cutoff point above which all candidates are ranked
equally leads applicants to work only hard enough to surpass the
cutoff, with perhaps some margin for uncertainty, and does not lead
to positional races of the kind described above.
These examples demonstrate that the welfare consequences of
a duty to train are difficult to determine. The current level of
preparation may be inefficiently high or low; in either case, some
groups may engage in too much training, whereas others undertake
too little. Because there is probably relatively little ex ante moral
hazard involved, the effects of disparate impact liability are largely
distributional, which directs the matter away from an efficiency
analysis towards a fairness-based rationale.1 3 °
A stronger case could be made here for a duty to train based on
within-groupfairness. Absent such a duty, courts are forced to treat
actually be welfare-enhancing.
129. There is also a threshold question of the test's validity or predictive ability. If the test
does not accurately measure who will do well on the job, or alternatively, who will do badly,
then the case for training is obviously weakened. Why should we encourage studying for a test
that yields little predictive information? One answer is that as between the studiers and nonstudiers, the studiers have at least shown more motivation, even if their efforts were fruitless,
in the sense of improving their performance on the job. Another answer is that the standard
requirements for job relatedness and business necessity would still remain. Unless the "lack
of effort" defense completely eliminates plaintiffs' disparate impact claims, the employer will
still have to show that the selection procedure is job related in order to prevail.
130. Even the administrative savings from eliminating potential plaintiffs who did not
train-ex post moral hazard-are likely to be small. Reducing the number of plaintiffs does
not guarantee a proportionate reduction in the administrative costs of disparate impact
liability, since all the test-failers, regardless of whether they trained, might well have joined
in a single suit against the employer.
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those who trained just like those who did not. Even if this has no
effect on who decides to train, it seems unfair: among a group of
plaintiffs, all of whom failed the test, should not society prefer those
applicants who made an effort to pass over those who did not?
2. Non-distributionalPreferences
The key issue in this context may not turn out to be society's
preferences over the final distribution of losses and gains from a
hypothetical test, but rather the means by which these losses and
gains are realized. For example, suppose society prefers to have 50
percent representation of women in some job, for which there is a
qualifying test. Assume that absent training by the female applicants, the test has a disparate impact by sex, but that training
completely eliminates the disparity. There are then two ways of
achieving the goal of equal representation. One possibility is that
women train for the test and achieve a pass rate equivalent to that
of men. Another alternative is that women fail to train, but achieve
a 50 percent representation rate through disparate impact litigation.
Society might well prefer the first approach to the second, even
though both achieve identical results. First, the non-litigation
strategy presumably involves lower administrative costs."'3 Second,
the training strategy almost certainly produces less antagonism or
demoralization of male test-takers. If the women train, some men
who take the test will lose out to some of the women who trained for
it. In the second scenario, these same men will initially rank higher
on the test, but will subsequently lose out to the women who sue.
Quite apart from any endowment effects, the mere fact of litigation
almost inevitably sharpens antagonism and leads to increased
hostility between winners and losers.'3 2 Much of this presumably
could be avoided if the final allocation of jobs to applicants was not
131. The tradeoff is that the non-litigation strategy obviously requires higher training costs
on the part of the individual plaintiffs. It is not clear a priori which approach has lower total
costs.
132. It seems intuitively plausible that the affected men would feel worse about losing a
job they thought they "had" than about not getting one in the first instance. Antagonism and
a sense of unfairness would only be compounded if the men lost out to women who did not
even train for the position in question.
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achieved by litigation. Finally, there may be some kinds of injuries
that can only be overcome by efforts of the injured party.13 Test
failers will sometimes succeed in using disparate impact liability to
overturn the use of the test and secure a position for themselves.
One might question, however, whether litigation can provide a real
remedy in this context, because hostility and stigma are the likely
consequences of such an action.
Of course, to the extent that society's preference for training is
based on the benefits it provides to those other than the trainees, we
must confront both the distributional and efficiency questions once
more. Is it fair that women have to bear the costs of training for the
running test in order to confer benefits on men, or on the rest of
society at large? And is it clear that the benefits to the men are
larger than the training costs incurred by the women? I do not see
any plausible way to answer the second question. As to the first
question, it might make sense to require that employers subsidize
the training necessary for female or African American applicants to
achieve more equal pass rates with white males. Indeed, a requirement that applicants make reasonable efforts to train would
presumably encourage employers to lower the costs of training, for
example, by providing sample tests, workout guides, and so forth.
By doing so, an employer would eliminate some potential liability,
either because applicants refused to train and lost their ability to
sue, or because they did train and, therefore, had a higher pass rate.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This Part discusses two related questions concerning the implementation of my proposal. The first is how to define "reasonable
efforts," and the second is whether defendants can use applicants'
lack of reasonable efforts to attack an overall disparity or only to
disqualify certain plaintiffs. I also consider possible extensions of
the duty to make reasonable efforts to other disparate impact
contexts.

133. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Some Truths About Black Disadvantage, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,

2005, at A8 (arguing that there are times when "the victim is the only one who can wholly
undo the harm he has suffered from others' wrongful actions").
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A. The Meaning of "ReasonableEfforts"
1. A Cost/Benefit Test
If plaintiffs are required to make reasonable efforts to prepare for
a test before they make a disparate impact claim, it remains to
determine what the proper standard for applicant effort should be.
An analog of the "Hand Rule," articulated in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.,"' suggests an appropriate answer.
Judge Hand's key insight was that the standard of reasonable
care to prevent losses to someone's boat is just the amount of care
that the defendant would take if he were spending to prevent losses
to his boat. Suppose that the amount of loss-the value of the
boat-is given at $1 million. The owner has to choose how much
care to undertake to reduce the risk of losing his boat. The rational
owner will weigh the cost of care against the expected benefit of
care, which is just the probability of loss multiplied by the amount
of loss. Because more care lowers the probability of loss, the owner
will want to keep spending until the cost of an additional unit of
care is just equal to the increase in the expected benefits that the
care purchases. The Hand formula is just the algebraic embodiment
of this insight.13
Return now to the facts of Lanning,and suppose, as suggested by
the dissent, that many applicants could have passed the test with
a relatively modest amount of training, which the employer in fact
urged them to undertake. 3 ' It seems likely that the police officer
jobs at issue in Lanning were substantially better than the best
alternative the plaintiffs would have been able to find if they
failed the test. The monetary gain in earnings for the plaintiffs if
they got the job, E, would therefore be large. Judge Weiss's dissent
134. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
135. In mathematical terms, the owner wants to choose the amount of care, B, so as to
maximize the expected net benefits of care (p(B)xL-B), where L is the amount of loss and p
is the probability that a loss occurs (which is a negative function of the amount of care taken).
The optimum is achieved when L xAp/AB=B. This is identical to Judge Hand's formulation
of the rule B = PL, if we assume that by P, Judge Hand actually meant the change in the
probability of loss resulting from a one unit increase in care.
136. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning1), 181 F.3d 478,495 (3d Cir.
1999).

562

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:515

strongly suggested that training could have dramatically increased
the chances that the plaintiffs would have been able to pass the
test.137 Thus, p was also likely to have been large. Judge Weiss also
concluded that the cost of training, C, was fairly small.' It follows
that if the expected gain from training, absent disparate impact
liability, would be larger than the costs, pE > C, then according to
the Hand Rule, plaintiffs failed to make reasonable, or cost-justified,
efforts to prevent the harm. Put another way, the plaintiffs could
probably have forestalled the harm to themselves at relatively low
cost, and because they failed to do so, they should not be allowed to
invoke disparate impact protection.
The standard for reasonable efforts I have just described is not a
demanding one. In fact, any fully informed and rational applicant
should voluntarily take such efforts as would maximize his or her
net gain from training, which is precisely what the standard
requires. Consequently, applicants who fail to make reasonable
efforts to study or train will almost by definition be (a) irrational; (b)
misinformed about the costs or benefits of training; (c) persons with
unusually high discount rates, risk aversion, or other costs of
training, or (d) persons with unusually low expected benefits from
obtaining the job.' 39
2. The Breadth of the Standard
A good way to test the utility of the reasonable efforts standard
is to see what results it yields when applied to the facts of a given
case. Consider the requirement that those hired have a high school
diploma, which was true for the electric power plant jobs the
plaintiffs were seeking in Griggs.4 ° Application of the reasonable
137. See id.
138. See id. Suppose training would increase the probability of passing the test from 0.12
(the average female pass rate) to 0.50, which makes p = 0.38. Let the average salary gain from
passing the test be $10,000, and the costs of preparation be $3000 (200 hours ($15/hour)).
Then the net expected gain from training is ((0.38 x $10,000) - $3000), which is a positive
$800.
139. This conclusion is analogous to the result in the standard economic model of accidents
under a negligence rule, showing again that it never pays to be negligent. See, e.g., ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2003); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
140. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971).
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efforts rule would probably sustain this part of the holding in Griggs
for two reasons. First, the African American plaintiffs would surely
have found the cost of securing a high school diploma, C, in the
segregated environment of the Jim Crow South to be high. Although
the benefits of getting a good job, E, would have been substantial,
having a high school diploma would not have helped the plaintiffs,
because before passage of Title VII most employers would simply
have excluded them on the basis of their race. Thus p would also
have been small-in fact, probably zero-and as a result, we can be
quite confident that pE would have been less than C for the Griggs
plaintiffs. Hence, even if the Griggscourt had seen fit to implement
a test of the kind considered here, the plaintiffs' failure to obtain
high school diplomas would not have constituted a lack of reasonable effort that would have disqualified their disparate impact
claims.
The second reason that a reasonable efforts requirement is
consistent with Griggs is that it is appropriate to invoke a much
narrower definition of "preparation" than in the previous analysis.
Consider the decision about whether to obtain a high school
diploma. That decision has certain costs, such as out of pocket
expenses and foregone time and earnings, as well as certain
benefits, such as enhanced future earnings. Few people, however,
choose to obtain a diploma based on eligibility for any single job that
requires a high school degree. In the case of Griggs, for example,
even if the plaintiffs could quite easily have completed high school,
it might well be the case that the costs of doing so were larger
than the Duke Power-specific benefits-that is, the enhanced
opportunity for a Duke Power job considered in isolation from any
other employment prospect that a high school diploma would have
provided.
Consequently, even if the overall rate of return of obtaining a
high school diploma is very large, as it now is,141 it is a mistake to
excuse any particular employer from disparate impact liability
because its standard requires a high school degree that would confer
general benefits on plaintiffs. The purpose of disparate impact
141. Derek Neal & William R. Johnson, Basic Skills and the Black-White EarningsGap,
in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 480, 490 tbl.14-7 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith
Phillips eds., 1998).
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liability is not to give plaintiffs an incentive to make decisions about
how much to invest in education. Rather, it is to prevent employers
from using selection practices that impinge on applicants' civil
rights. Plaintiffs should be encouraged to undertake job specific
training or preparation because doing so relieves employers of an
unfair burden, but there is no reason to use the reasonable efforts
defense to encourage general training. If society is concerned with
low graduation rates, then direct steps to promote graduation are
warranted.
It is worth noting, however, that Duke Power apparently did offer
"Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for high school
training" for those without a high school degree.14 The existence
of this subsidy might conceivably have given Duke Power a "lack of
effort" defense under my proposal. The issue would turn on whether
the costs of the training, including the subsidy, but also including
the non-financial costs such as the opportunity costs of time, were
less than the expected benefits in terms of enhanced possibilities for
advancement at Duke Power. It is hard to know how this essentially
empirical question would be resolved.
It should also be stressed that the Griggs plaintiffs challenged
not only the use of a high school graduation requirement, but also
the use of two tests that Duke Power adopted as requirements for
several classes of jobs. 14' There was no offer to subsidize any
training for these tests, nor is it clear that such training was even
possible, let alone sufficiently cost-effective to qualify as a reasonable effort on the part of the plaintiffs. At least this part of the
holding in Griggs-striking down the use of these tests-would
certainly remain intact under the proposed "lack of effort" defense.
The problem of how broadly to define the benefits of training also
arose in Lanning. There were probably many benefits from training
for the running test that might have flowed to the female plaintiffs
in Lanning: getting into physical shape can improve one's health,
142. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
143. After the effective date of Title VII, the company required all new employees "to ...
register satisfactory scores on two professionally prepared aptitude tests, as well as to have
a high school education." Id. at 427-28. Current employees who wished to transfer into "the
four desirable departments from which Negroes had been excluded" had to have either a high
school degree or a passing score on "two tests-the Wonderlic Personnel Test ...
and the
Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test." Id. at 428.

2007]

CONTRIBUTORY DISPARATE IMPACTS

565

psychological mood, longevity, and so on. These benefits should not
be included in the cost/benefit test to decide whether female
plaintiffs who failed to train for the test were unreasonable. There
is no reason to give the employer a free ride just because applicants
did not avail themselves of potential benefits that are unrelated to
the job in question.'4 4 Again, disparate impact liability is not
supposed to protect only those who work vigorously to protect their
own health. Hence, in evaluating the employer's defense in Lanning,
the only benefits that should be included in the plaintiffs' hypothetical calculations are those directly traceable to the increased
likelihood of obtaining SEPTA employment-the benefits of passing
the test.
B. Wholesale Disparitiesvs. Individual Plaintiffs
Imagine a test that is passed by 75 percent of men and 40 percent
of women. There is a clear disparate impact here, because the
female pass rate is only 53 percent of the figure for male applicants.
But suppose that 80 percent of the women applicants did not train
for the test, and that if they had, they would have passed at the
same 75 percent rate as men. 145 In this obviously extreme example,
the pass rate with training would be identical, so there would be no
disparate impact when everyone trained.
The question then arises whether an employer in this situation
should be allowed to use a reasonable effort requirement to
challenge the existence of the disparity, or whether he should only
be allowed to use the requirement to disqualify the 55 applicants
who failed but did not train. 46 My tentative answer is that this
situation is unlikely to arise, but if it does, employers should be able
to use failure to train to rebut the existence of a disparity. It seems
incongruous to disqualify the 55 non-training test-failers as
potential plaintiffs, but to count their failures nonetheless when
144. For a contrary view based on efficiency concerns, see Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat,
Does Risk to OneselfIncrease the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 19 (2000) (arguing that risks to self should increase the care owed to others).
145. Consequently, 20 percent of the women trained and passed at a 75 percent rate, while
80 percent of the women did not train and passed at a 31.25 percent rate, for an average pass
rate of 40 percent for women as a group.
146. Suppose there are 100 applicants. There will be (1-0.3125)(80) = 55 non-training test
failers, yet there will also be (1-0.75)(20) = 5 applicants who trained and still failed.
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assessing liability to the remaining five test-failers who did train.
Moreover, by providing this defense, employers are encouraged to
promote training by applicants, for example, by offering in-house
training programs.14' The burden, of course, would be on the
employer to show what the counterfactual pass rate would have
been if more women had trained, and that the training would have
been reasonable in the sense defined above.
C. Other Contexts
Disparate impact liability is a feature of many other civil rights
statutes apart from Title VII. Space does not permit a thorough
examination of all of these settings, but the same reasonable effort
principles could apply to plaintiffs in housing, credit markets, and
other circumstances. Consider automobile finance, for example. In
Coleman v. GMAC,' 48 plaintiffs alleged that the lender who financed
the purchases of their new cars encouraged dealers to charge a
markup to the buyer/borrower, and that these markups had a
racially disparate impact in violation of the Equal Credit Opportu49
nity Act.
As in Lanning, it is true that the plaintiffs could probably have
done something to reduce or even eliminate the disparity. In
Coleman, the obvious alternative was for the plaintiffs to secure
more or better financing offers through sources other than the
dealership from which they were buying their cars. Shopping
around is not especially onerous, and on any reasonable guess as to
costs, it would likely be an investment with a positive net return
given the substantial markups the dealers were charging. Shopping
would thus likely be required of reasonable plaintiffs under the
rationale discussed above.
Although the buyers did fail to look beyond the dealership for
financing, there are two strong arguments for why Coleman was
nevertheless correctly decided in the buyers' favor. First, the
markups were never disclosed. Buyers were not told the dealership's
"buy rate," its cost of funds from the lender, or the markup they
147. Applicants who did not train would thus forfeit their ability to sue, and those who did
not train and failed the test would not be counted in the overall failure rate for their group.
148. Coleman v. GMAC, 196 F.R.D. 315 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
149. Id. at 317-18.
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were being charged;' all they knew was the ultimate interest rate.
Thus, plaintiffs would be unlikely to know that they should have
shopped around because the benefit of doing so-the reduction in
markup-was hidden by the defendant. 5 ' When the defendants
know the benefits of effort and plaintiffs do not, defendants should
be able to use a reasonable efforts defense only if they disclose such
benefits. This, in effect, reveals
to plaintiffs that they have an
52
interest in further search.
Even if the markups were disclosed, however, the defendant's
decision to extract supra-competitive prices by exploiting their
market power should not constitute a justification for a practice
with a disparate impact under the business necessity defense. In
this instance, efficiency and equity can be seen to work together,
forcing sellers to abandon discretionary markups.' 53
CONCLUSION

An employer's liability for selection procedures that have a
disparate impact by race or gender unjustified by business necessity
is now a settled element of employment discrimination law. Neither
courts nor scholarly commentators have devoted much attention to
whether an employer is liable for any disparity, largely because the
theory of disparate impact seems to suggest that the mere identification of a racial or gender disparity suffices to create liability,
regardless of the reason for its existence.
Disparate impact liability can be thought of as a kind of implicit
social contract. The terms of that contract are, of course, unclear,
as they always are in implied contracts. But on one side, the contract clearly offers certain groups protection against disparities or
other unfair outcomes that are beyond their control. The other side
of the implicit bargain is that when protected-class applicants can
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Note that in Lanning I, the defendants did suggest that training for the test would be
beneficial, and even offered guidelines on how to train effectively. By contrast, the seller(s)
in Coleman made every effort to conceal the size of the finance charge markup. Compare
Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning1), 181 F.3d 478,495 (3d Cir. 1999), with
Coleman, 196 F.R.D. at 317-18.
153. See Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standardfor
Assessing When DisparateImpacts are Justified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669 (2007).
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prevent or mitigate the disparity that results from some selection
mechanism, they should have a duty to do so. Otherwise, disparate
impact doctrine runs the risk of becoming a form of patronization,
implicitly assuming that protected-class applicants are simply too
infirm to help themselves and should not be asked to do so. In the
context of Griggs, that assumption was socially and historically
plausible; but it is strikingly less so in today's world.
In the end, the purpose of this Article is a modest one. It is merely
to suggest that not all disparities are the same: there are some
instances in which plaintiffs could eliminate or reduce disparities at
a reasonable cost to themselves. When this is possible, the law
should encourage them to do so.

